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A Legal Theory of Finance1

Katharina Pistor

Abstract:
This paper develops the building blocks for a legal theory of finance. LTF holds that
financial markets are legally constructed and as such occupy an essentially hybrid place
between state and market, public and private. At the same time, financial markets exhibit
dynamics that frequently put them in direct tension with commitments enshrined in law
or contracts. This is the case especially in times of financial crisis when the full
enforcement of legal commitments would result in the self-destruction of the financial
system. This law-finance paradox tends to be resolved by suspending the full force of law
where the survival of the system is at stake; that is, at its apex. It is here that power
becomes salient.
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1. Introduction

This paper develops the contours of a legal theory of finance (LTF) for contemporary
financial systems, i.e. systems that mobilize capital today for future returns. The history
of money and credit dates back millennia (Hodgson 2013), but the configuration of global
financial capitalism is of more recent vintage. It is this system that is the concern of this
paper and the theory it develops. LTF asserts that finance is legally constructed; it does
not stand outside the law. Financial assets are contracts the value of which depends in
large part on their legal vindication (Bradley 1902). Which financial assets will or will
not be vindicated is a function of legal rules and their interpretation by courts and
regulators. This may vary from legal system to legal system. In a world of free capital
flows, legally enforceable financial commitments that link market participants from
different countries and legal systems to one another determine the scope of the financial
system. The ability to design instruments that are not obviously in conflict with existing
rules in different jurisdictions even as they seek to mitigate their costs on the issuers or
holders renders a comparative advantage. In short, law and finance are locked into a
dynamic process in which the rules that establish the game are continuously challenged
by new contractual devices, which in turn seek legal vindication.
LTF is based on two premises outside of yet, as will become clear, reinforced by law:
Fundamental uncertainty and liquidity volatility. The two go together: If the future were
known we could take precaution to deal with future liquidity scarcity; if liquidity were
always available on demand, i.e. a free good, we could refinance commitments as needed
when the future arrives. Based on these premises LTF can illuminate core features of the
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contemporary global financial system, including its inherent instability, its organization
into an apex and a periphery, the differential application of law in its different parts and
last but not least the locus of discretionary power. As such LTF can serve as the
foundation for a political economy of finance. Within this framework there is ample room
for analyzing the behavior of actors using rational choice models, but also a more socially
embedded approach in socioeconomics (see infra under 5). LTF’s critical contribution is
to emphasize that the legal structure of finance is of first order importance for explaining
and predicting the behavior of market participants as well as market-wide outcomes.

2. Uncertainty, Liquidity and the Instability of Finance

Before explaining the elements of LTF in greater detail I turn to the two premises on
which it rests – uncertainty and liquidity volatility – and their implications for the nature
of finance, namely its inherent instability. Frank Knight argued long ago that any attempt
to capture dynamic rather than static phenomena must grapple with the problem of
fundamental uncertainty; that is, with risk that cannot be quantitatively measured (Knight
1921). This is the case whenever circumstances are unique and deviate from “invariable
and universally known laws” (ibid at III.VII.3). Such circumstances cannot be reduced to
variables that lend themselves to probability calculations, and the distribution of possible
outcomes is unknown (ibid at III.VIII.2). These cases call for judgment, not calculus.
Keynes developed a similar concept in his Treatise on Probability, also published in 1921
(Keynes 1921(2010)). Building on this insight, he later emphasized that the process of
accumulating wealth is necessarily a long-term project that is beset by our inability to
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know the future. Writing in 1937, he elaborated:
The sense in which I am using the term [uncertainty] is that in which the prospect of a
European war is uncertain, or the price of copper and the rate of interest twenty years
hence, or the obsolescence of a new invention, or the position of private wealthowners in the social system in 1970. About these matters there is no scientific basis
on which to form any calculable probability whatever. We simply do not know.
(Keynes 1937, 214)

It follows that we cannot fully predict the future and that, therefore, any investment
strategy devised today will have to be adjusted should the future deviate from
assumptions made today. This does not have to but frequently goes hand in hand with a
financial crisis, in particular when substantial readjustments have to be made throughout
the economy. The frequency of financial crises in the history of financial markets
corroborates these predictions (Kindelberger 2005). Reinhart and Rogoff offer eight
hundred years of evidence that financial crises occur much more frequently than people
are willing to believe (Reinhart and Rogoff 2009). In fact, there is little disagreement
even among proponents of the efficient capital market hypothesis (ECMH) that at least
some aspects of finance are beset by inherent instability. Specifically, entities that engage
in maturity transformation, i.e. banks, are widely held to be vulnerable to crises (Allen
and Gale 2001; Levine 1998). They finance long-term commitments with short-term
funds that can be withdrawn on demand. Whenever too many depositors seek to
withdraw their money these entities face extinction with potential repercussions for other
entities and the system. The vulnerability of financial markets to such bank runs has
found a regulatory response in the form of deposit insurance. Private intermediaries that
engage in similar bank-like activities, such as hedge funds, have instead unilaterally
imposed at times redemption restrictions to ensure their survival in times of liquidity
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shortage.
Where there is disagreement is whether instability extends beyond intermediaries to
financial markets, or whether financial markets can instead solve the instability problem
by diversifying risk. Financial innovation has made possible the splitting of credit, default
and interest rate risk; prior to the global crisis it was widely believed that this kind of risk
diversification had ushered in a period of “great moderation”, where instability was
contained.2 There are, however, good reasons to believe that the root causes of instability
are the same for banks and markets. Both offer mechanisms for investing capital today in
the hope and expectation of positive future returns, and both have to confront the
conundrum that knowledge about the future is imperfect and liquidity is not a free good.
Under these conditions, splitting risk cannot offer full protection against future events or
a reversal of liquidity abundance.
The concept of liquidity as used in this paper is the ability to sell any asset for other
assets or cash at will.3 Selling or buying assets is intertwined with balancing one’s assets
and liabilities and as such necessarily links funding liquidity and market liquidity. This
definition differs from others used in the literature. Brunnermeir and Pedersen (2009), for
example, define market illiquidity as the “difference between the transaction price and
the fundamental value” and funding illiquidity as “speculators’ scarcity (or shadow costs)
of capital” (ibid at 2202). This assumes that it is possible to determine an asset’s
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See Ben Bernanke, “The Great Moderation”, 20 February 2004, available at
http://www.federalreserve.gov/boarddocs/speeches/2004/20040220/default.htm, for an argument that
macroeconomic policies account for the decreased volatility in the economy.
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See also Keynes, who defines “liquidity preferences” as “a schedule of the amounts of his resources,
valued in terms of money or of wage-units, which he will wish to retain in the form of money in different
sets of circumstances”. (Keynes 1937) Chapter 13 at II. See also Mehrling (2011, at 5/6) who associates
liquidity with shiftability (ibid at 38).
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fundamental value as compared to its value or volatility relative to other assets and to
conceptually differentiate speculators from other investors. Yet, as the US Supreme Court
has put it, while “scholastics of medieval times professed a means to make such a
valuation of a commodity’s ‘worth’”, this may not be a meaningful exercise for today’s
courts nor arguably modern day academics in economics or law .4 In fact, it is not what
market actors do: they are more concerned with relative, not absolute value (Frydman and
Goldberg 2011). Lastly, in a market-based credit system that is largely reliant on “Ponzifinance”, as Minsky has defined financing strategies that rely ex ante on refinancing in
the future (Minsky 1986 at 226), the distinction between speculators and other market
participants becomes less tenable. Adjusting existing investment strategies to new facts
entails selling some assets and/or buying new ones. Yet, not all assets may find takers, or
only at a substantial loss, and not all sellers will obtain refinancing, which they must
when confronting shortfalls in cash or other sellable assets to meet their own liabilities. In
the worst case scenario a fire sale of assets may occur which can trigger an economywide downward price readjustment and potentially mass insolvencies. The likelihood of
such an extreme scenario depends on how many investors will have to seek refinancing at
the same time; the number will be higher the more investors have built their strategies on
the ability to refinance on demand. In short, for a crisis to occur uncertainty must meet
liquidity shortage.

4

BASIC INC. v. LEVINSON, 485 U.S. 224 (1988) at 255.
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3. Generating Theory from Facts: LTF as an Inductive Theory

LTF is an inductive theory. It is derived from observable facts from across the whole
spectrum of finance, including stock markets, credit markets, sovereign debt markets,
foreign exchange markets and markets for derivatives. Markets rather than intermediaries
were chosen as the primary unit of analysis to highlight the fact that markets themselves,
just like financial intermediaries, are constructed in law and do not exist outside it, and
that they too can experience runs, as the global financial crisis has vividly demonstrated.
The theory of science teaches us that one can hardly identify relevant empirical
observations without an underlying idea of an order in one’s mind, i.e. without a theory.
This does not mean, however, that one is limited to the mental maps that are currently in
use. It is possible, though difficult, to construct a new theoretical map, to compare it with
existing ones, and to ask whether it explains what is known about a specific field of
inquiry in a more consistent or unified fashion than its chief competitors (Viskovatoff
1999). The stylized facts further explained below should therefore be understood as the
construction site of a new theoretical map for the field of finance.
The most important stylized facts of contemporary finance, both national and global,
are first, that financial assets are legally constructed; second, that law contributes to
finance’s instability; third, that there is a pecking order of the means of pay, which
implies that finance is inherently hierarchical; and fourth, that the binding nature of legal
and contractual commitments tends to be inversely related to the hierarchy of finance:
Law tends to be binding on the periphery and relatively more elastic at the apex of the
financial system.
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a. The Legal Construction of Finance
Financial systems comprise a complex, interdependent web of contractual
obligations, or IOUs, that link market participants to one another. What one owes to
another must be funded by assets or by claims owed by a third party. IOUs can be
designed and issued by private or public parties. Examples of publicly issued financial
instruments are the officially designated state money, or legal tender, as well as sovereign
debt contracts. Sovereign debt may be issued under domestic or foreign law and may be
denominated in domestic or foreign currency (Gelpern and Gulati 2013). It creates a
contractual obligation for a sovereign state. This renders the enforceability of debt
contracts at times doubtful: After all, entire states cannot be seized and liquidated
(Schwartz and Zurita 1992), and only assets located overseas can be frozen. Moreover,
when issued sovereign issues debt under its own laws, it can escape legal obligation by
changing those very laws. Still, financiers have successfully sued even their own
sovereigns for default as early as the seventeenth century in England (Neal 1990). In fact,
most states pay most of their debt most of the time, if not out of fear of being sued, in
order to secure future access to capital markets. The risk of litigation appears to be
increasing in our own time, especially with respect to sovereign debt issued to foreign
investors. Foreign investors have brought arbitration proceedings against sovereigns that
have defaulted on their external debt (Halverson Cross 2011), and a recent court case
raises the specter of enforceability of such claims in foreign courts, notwithstanding
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sovereign immunity.5 This suggests that law matters even for contracts with a sovereign,
albeit in a more circumspect or elastic fashion.6
As for financial instruments that are issued by private entities, they may be tailored to
specific clients or standardized with or without clauses that allow some adaptation.
Shares in a publicly traded company must, in principle, be transferable, and laws or stock
market rules impose voting arrangements, such as one-share-one-vote. Irrespective of
whether these legal design features are priced by the market, they entail different rights
and obligations. Their relevance is revealed in critical life and death situations – i.e. when
a company faces a merger or takeover or seeks to reorganize.7 Further, the proliferation
of preferred stock or convertible shares illustrates how legal innovation can alter firms’
capital structure with important governance implications. Complex capital structures
devised by banks in response to regulation or diffuse takeover threats, for example, have
undermined shareholder ‘voice’ in these entities (Benston et al. 2000).
Credit contracts entail obligations to repay the principal plus interest at a future date,
but the form of pay and the structure of interest rate payments can vary considerably. In
addition to simple credits and bonds there is a wide range of tradable IOUs, from
commercial paper to asset-backed securities, from options to futures and swaps, from
simple derivatives to synthetic ones (Awrey 2013). Some are purely private constructs,
others, such as mortgage-backed securities, were first created by law but subsequently
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See the recent decision of the Southern District of New York on the “pari passu” (meaning equal standing
of different creditors) clauses in Argentine sovereign debt contracts. NML Capital Ltd. v. Argentina, 26
October 2012, 12-105(L). Note, however, that the decision is currently under appeal.
6

On the elasticity of law at the apex of the system, see infra under d.
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Interestingly, charter provisions that might affect such scenarios are typically not priced at the IPO stage.
See (Klausner 2001).
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mimicked and further developed by the private sector (Hyman 2011).
The critical role law plays in the construction of financial markets may be best
illustrated by the emergence of global derivatives markets (Awrey 2013; Carruthers
2013). Over-the-counter (OTC) derivatives had been known for quite a while before a
global market in these instruments arose. For this to occur, contractual practices had to be
standardized to ensure scalability and investors needed reasonable assurance that these
instruments would withstand legal scrutiny by regulators and courts in countries where
they were issued, held and traded. The International Swaps and Derivatives Association
(ISDA), a private organization that brought together the major issuers and brokers of
these instruments as well as their legal advisors (Morgan 2008), played a critical role in
the rise of these markets. It created standard contracts, adapted them to different legal
systems around the world, enlisted major law firms in these jurisdictions to opine on their
enforceability and lobbied legislatures to adapt their bankruptcy laws to the netting
agreements contained therein (Roe 2011). Without having extended the legal
infrastructure to these new instruments it is hardly conceivable that global derivatives
markets would have grown into multi-trillion dollar markets.
The web of legally permissible IOUs – credits, bonds, derivatives, but also common
stock, convertible shares, etc. – that link parties to one another constitutes financial
markets and determines their scope. An additional layer of interdependence is created by
the fact that many IOUs explicitly reference other assets or IOUs. Securitized mortgages
are tied to underlying mortgages and their interest schedule. Credit default swaps (CDSs)
are insurance contracts designed to protect buyers of bonds and other instruments against
changes in the value of the underlying asset and require their issuers to put up additional
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collateral should that price change. Other instruments are contractually linked to changes
in anchor interest rates, such as the London Interbank Offered Rate (LIBOR, which is
constructed by the British Bankers’ Association with input from selected banks),8 or in
the price of assets that were deemed safe at the time of issuance, such as certain
sovereign debt. These contractual cross-references can trigger a predetermined chain
reaction with potentially system-destabilizing effects, as further discussed below.

b. Legal Sources of Finance’s Instability
Fundamental uncertainty paired with the liquidity constraint renders financial markets
instable. Given these conditions, pre-determined, binding, non-negotiable legal
commitments can hasten a financial crisis and in the extreme case the financial system’s
demise.
Every depositor who places his money in a bank account has the right to withdraw
her funds on demand, as does every investor in an open-ended mutual or money-market
fund. Their rights are contractually created and protected by law. If all enforce their rights
at the same time, however, a system built around maturity mismatch must collapse.
Deposit insurance is one way to mitigate against this risk, but because of moral hazard
concerns is limited to regulated banks. Market-based solutions protect individual parties
against future events through insurance devices; they tend to operate in a pro-cyclical
fashion and can therefore exacerbate rather than mitigate the system’s instability.

8

The fact that LIBOR is not simply a market product but constructed by financial intermediaries at the
apex of the system has been revealed by the LIBOR scandal, which showed that banks that purportedly
reported actual borrowing costs (which would be used to construct LIBOR) often under-reported these
costs. See Brooke Masters, “Libor rates cull proposed for April”, The Financial Times, 9 November 2012
at 24.

11

Take the example of AIG Financial Products (AIGFP), the London subsidiary of
AIG, which doled out US$31 bln in the first nine month of 2008 in response to
contractually agreed upon collateral calls when US housing prices decline (COP 2010).
AIGFP in turn had to balance its own assets and liabilities; it had taken precaution for its
exposure to potential collateral calls by opening a credit line with its parent company.
This arrangement brought AIG close to bankruptcy, from which it was saved only by a
government bailout. Notably, the US government takeover did not and could not stop the
bleeding because it left existing contractual commitments intact. This prompted the US
government to acquire all outstanding CDSs at the nominal value of US$62 bln (ibid at
39). Had it allowed AIG and its subsidiary to go bankrupt and be liquidated, under
existing bankruptcy laws creditors would have been left with empty hands and their
contractual claims would have been extinguished. Because of the contractual
interdependencies built into the system, such an event would have had serious
repercussions for global financial markets. Specifically, AIGFP had issued huge volumes
of CDSs to major financial intermediaries around the world in the years leading up to the
crisis. Had the CDSs been cancelled, the French bank Société General would have had to
make up for a shortfall of insurance in the amount of US$16.5 bln, Goldman Sachs in the
amount of US$14.5 bln and Deutsche Bank in the amount of US$8.5 bln (ibid at 94).
Making up for these losses would have been a difficult if not impossible proposition in
the immediate aftermath of the collapse of Lehman Brothers, when global financial
markets had come to a virtual standstill. Even entities without direct exposure to AIGissued CDSs might have been implicated, because they were trading bonds insured by
CDSs AIG had issued or were transacting with major banks directly exposed to them. In
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short, while perfectly rational from the perspective of individual contractors, predetermined, non-negotiable obligations designed to mitigate the effect of future
contingencies on individual parties, such as collateral calls, margin calls, etc., can
increase the financial system’s vulnerability to crisis. They are necessarily based on
assumptions about future events (i.e. a low probability that they will occur) that might
turn out to be false.

c. Finance as a Hierarchical System
As stated above, public and private entities create, issue and trade financial
instruments, i.e. contractual commitments that are enforceable in a court of law. In
normal times most financial instruments appear as close substitutes to official or state
money in the sense that they can easily be bought and sold for one another or for cash.
However, when too many investors seek to change their portfolio of assets at the same
time, some assets will no longer find takers as investors flee to safety: They buy cash or
close cash substitutes, such as reputable corporate or government bonds. This implies that
finance is not flat, but hierarchical (Mehrling 2012).
A complex system of interdependent contractual commitments can be maintained and
might even appear to be flat as long as there are enough intermediaries willing and able to
acquire all kinds of financial instruments, if only for a premium. Many financial
intermediaries make money in good times by offering two-way dealer services to other
market participants against a premium to cover the liquidity risk they take on. Without
these two-way dealer services many markets for assets would simply not exist (Mehrling
2012), and when dealers no longer offer liquidity these markets crash (Brunnermeier and
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Pedersen 2009).
Private lenders and dealers at times step in to dampen a liquidity crisis and buy assets
for which there are only few buyers left – usually in the hope of making a profit by
selling them to investors once markets have recovered or to a lender or dealer of last
resort. Consider, for example, MF Global’s late 2011 investment in distressed European
sovereign debt in the expectation that interventions by the European Central Bank (ECB)
would drive up prices before its funding dried up. In the end, ECB intervention came too
late for MF Global, which was too small to offer effective lender or last resort services in
any event. Moreover, it had used short-term hedges that matured before the bonds, thus
upping the ante for its own demise. 9 Ultimately the brokerage was forced into
bankruptcy. This example holds important lessons for private parties as emergency
lenders or dealers in times of crisis. They can assume this role only up to the point where
their own survival is at stake. This implies that in the last instance the only true lender or
dealer of last resort is an agent with unlimited supplies of high-powered money
(Mehrling 2011). 10 Only few actors can assume this role: Sovereigns (or their central
banks) that control their own currency and who issue most of their debt in that currency.
The global crisis demonstrated that Ireland, for example, lacked these attributes. The
lack of its own currency undermined its ability to stabilize finance by socializing private
debt. The ensuing sovereign debt crisis raised questions about Ireland’s ability to ever
grow out of this debt burden, thereby undermining its ability to refinance itself on

9

See Miles Weiss, Cristina Alesci & Matt Leising, “Corzine Pushed Europe Bet to $11.5 Billion”,
Bloomberg, 29 November 2011, available at www.bloomberg.com/news (last visited 2 February 2013).
10

Stating that (some) sovereign states have unlimited access to high-powered money is not the same as
saying that mobilizing these resources is costless. Printing money may create inflationary pressures and
quantitative easing can set off asset bubbles in countries far afield.
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international debt markets – forcing it ultimately to accept a European bailout. Most
emerging markets that have their own currency but are forced to borrow in foreign
currency find themselves in a similar predicament (Kinsella and Leddin 2010). There is
thus a clear hierarchy in global finance, which is mirrored in the organization of foreign
exchange markets. The dollar is the currency against which all other currencies in FX
markets are compared. All other “major” currencies are valued in dollars before they are
compared to one another (Mehrling 2013). It is also the currency for which there is the
highest demand in times of crisis irrespective of weaknesses in the performance of the US
economy. Many other currencies never make it into the pages of the financial press
because they are rarely traded, indicating that they are not deemed important assets in
global foreign exchange markets.
Domestic financial markets are also hierarchical. This can be illustrated by examining
the measures the US Federal Reserve took in response to the global crisis. It created six
major liquidity facilities between March and November of 2008 (OIG 2010), known by
their acronyms: TSLF, PDCF, AMLF, CPFF, MMIFF and TALF. 11 They were
established to provide liquidity to different intermediaries in the following order: First to
primary dealers authorized to acquire US treasuries at the New York Fed’s open market
desk;12 second to special purpose vehicles of major banks (many of which also operate
primary dealer desks) that invested heavily in sovereign and corporate bonds; third to
intermediaries with exposure to asset-backed commercial papers of non-financials

11

These acronyms stand for: Term Securities Lending Facility (TSLF), Primary Dealer Credit Facility
(PDCF), Asset Backed Commercial Paper Money Market Mutual Fund Liquidity Facility (AMLF),
Commercial Paper Funding Facility (CPFF), Money Market Investor Funding Facility (MMIFF) and Term
Asset Backed Securities Loan Facility (TALF). For details see (OIG 2010, 3).

12

Appendix IV of OIG (2010) lists the primary dealers as of June 2010.
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(among them, again, money market funds); and last to intermediaries investing in assetbacked consumer loans. The sequence of Fed actions reflects its primary concern with
ensuring the proper functioning of the apex of the system, namely the funding of the
sovereign, followed by the funding of intermediaries that fund the sovereign, followed by
the funding of their counterparties. This implies that the first order funders and their
immediate counterparties find themselves in closest proximity to the apex of the system.
In contrast, intermediaries lending to firms or consumers were last in order, signifying
their peripheral status. They were thrown a lifeline at long last, but primarily for political
reasons (the fear that austerity might create structural unemployment or a political
backlash), not because they posed an immediate threat to the financial system. As will
become clear in the subsequent section, one’s location in the hierarchical system has
important implications for one’s legal treatment in times of crisis and beyond.

d. Law’s Elasticity
A legal system committed to the rule of law is meant to apply law irrespective of
status or identity. Contracts are designed to create credible commitments that are
enforceable as written. Yet, closer inspection of contractual relations, laws and
regulations in finance suggests that law is not quite as evenly designed or applied
throughout the system. Instead, it is elastic. The elasticity of law can be defined as the
probability that ex ante legal commitments will be relaxed or suspended in the future;13
the higher that probability the more elastic the law. In general, law tends to be relatively
elastic at the system’s apex, but inelastic on its periphery. It is thus at the periphery where

13

Suggested by Sarah Quinn at the final workshop of this research project.
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default is most likely to result in involuntary exit. In contrast, at the apex where the very
survival of the system is at stake, law tends to be more elastic by design and/or because
the system’s ultimate backstop abrogates the discretionary power to do what it takes to
rescue the system.14
Contractual arrangements are often hardwired, but not all are equally so. Private
swaps and derivatives contracts consist of hundreds of pages that stipulate the conditions
that trigger collateral calls and specify their amounts. In contrast, the Federal Reserve Act
gives the Fed the discretionary powers in emergency situations to lend against “adequate
collateral”. 15 The swap agreements between major central banks meant to secure the
global payment system occupy only seven pages of text even as they deal with billions of
dollars, euros, francs, pounds or yens.16 What are in substance similar transactions (i.e.
swaps) can take different forms depending on who the parties are and where they are
located in the hierarchical financial system.17
Similar patterns can be found elsewhere in the global hierarchy of finance. Consider
the different fates of homeowners in the context of plummeting real estate markets in
countries around the world. Homeowners in the US may be on the periphery of the US
financial system (see supra): While major financial intermediaries received emergency
liquidity support from the Fed or government bailouts, homeowners faced personal
bankruptcy and foreclosure in accordance with the law. However, they are still better off

14

The chairman of the Fed, Ben Bernanke, famously defined this role as “we do everything it takes” to
save the financial system.

15

See Sec. 13(3) of the Federal Reserve Act prior to changes introduced by the Dodd-Frank Act, which still
grant substantial discretion to the Fed in determining the conditions under which it will extend liquidity.
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These agreements are available at http://www.newyorkfed.org/markets/liquidity_swap.html.

17

Note that frequently private contracts make broad reference to standard swaps, which makes them appear
shorter than they are. That is still consistent with the argument.
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than their counterparts in Hungary or Spain. The debt of Hungarian homeowners, for
example, was compounded by the fact that two thirds of mortgages were made in foreign
currency – the euro or Swiss franc – and these currencies appreciated in the midst of the
crisis (by 40 percent) relative to the domestic currency (Rona-Tas and Guseva 2013).18
Moreover, in Spain (and most other countries), mortgage-backed loans are full recourse
loans (whereas in many states in the US they are not (Ghent and Kudlyak 2011)): If
property value is under water, homeowners still carry the burden of the entire amount
they had contracted for. The global market for real estate finance thus also exhibits an
apex and a periphery, where homeowners at the periphery carry not only the full credit
risk, but frequently also the currency risk. If anything, the difference between apex and
periphery is more pronounced, because in the transnational realm there are fewer
mechanisms to re-distribute loss.
Financial innovation plays an important role in managing the elasticity of contractual
commitments as well as legal constraints. An important purpose of financial innovation is
to alleviate the costs of regulation by, for example, freeing capital from reserve
requirements and making them available for lending purposes. Some authors have
attributed the rise of sometimes destabilizing financial innovation with the constraints
imposed by the Basel Accords, which are said to have created incentives for the extensive
use of off-balance sheet accounting and structured finance to free up regulatory capital
(Acharya and Richardson 2009). Regulatory reforms in the aftermath of the financial
crisis have triggered another round of financial innovation to mitigate the costs of these

18

Note, however, that the Hungarian government intervened and forced creditors to adjust loans and share
their currency risk. In doing so they habe brought home owners a step closer to the system’s apex.
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regulations for individual firms. Examples include synthetic exchange traded funds
(ETFs) and collateral swaps, further discussed by Awrey in this issue. Or take the case of
central bank swap lines. When financial markets froze, trade suffered because parties no
longer had access to liquid foreign exchange (FX) markets. The solution was for Central
Banks to act as each other’s go between in supplying the relevant FX to domestic parties
(Obstfeld, Shambaugh, and Taylor 2009). However, not every central bank received a
swap line from the Fed or the guardians of the other major currencies; only those deemed
critical for stability did.19
These examples suggest that while hierarchy may be “inherent” to modern finance
(Mehrling 2013), its specific manifestation is anything but natural. The countries at the
top of the global hierarchy owe their position to historical contingencies, for example as
winners of world wars (the US) or beneficiaries of cold wars (Germany). Their position
has been enhanced by the fact that they (the G7) also controlled the rules of the game for
global finance set forth in the Basel Concordat and the Basel Accords, and not
coincidentally, by the prowess of the financial intermediaries they house.
Where one is located in the hierarchy matters for one’s survival constraint. Those at
the very apex of the system exercise discretionary powers in times of crisis over whether
to intervene and whom to rescue, and those sufficiently close to the apex are more likely
to benefit from the relaxation or suspension of ex ante legal commitments than those on
the periphery. Law matters for the position of different actors within the hierarchy.
Whether housing loans are structured as recourse or non-recourse loans determines the
distribution of losses between borrowers and lenders from a steep decline in real estate
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value. It also matters whether the parties to a derivatives contract can net out their claims
outside the pool of assets available for distribution to all other creditors. This effectively
prioritizes them over other creditors and has contributed to the growth of derivatives
markets (Morgan 2008; Carruthers 2013). Similarly, whether sovereigns can issue debt
under their own law or that of a foreign jurisdiction affects the borrower’s room to
maneuver ex post.
On rule of law grounds such differential application of the law is objectionable. Yet,
in the context of a highly instable financial system, the elasticity of law has proved time
and again critical for avoiding a complete financial meltdown. This was the most
important lesson drawn from the Great Depression, when the Fed’s refusal to buy only
those assets that had been enumerated in law contributed to collapse (Mehrling 2011, 35).
The degree of elasticity and discretion that is required to stabilize a financial system
depends, of course, in large measure on how much instability it tolerates in the first place,
i.e. on its legal construction. The greater the tolerance for financial instability ex ante, the
more likely that law and contracts will have to be suspended ex post – even though this
undermines the credibility of financial contracting on which the system rests.

4. The Legal Theory of Finance

These stylized facts can be woven into a legal theory of finance -- a theoretical map
that is internally consistent and offers explanations for how contemporary finance
operates in good as well as in bad times. No attempt will be made to systematically test
this theory at this point. That is left to future research. Instead, evidence taken from case

20

studies published in this issue and other sources will be used to explain the theory’s main
building blocks, which explain financial markets as (a) rule-bound systems that are (b)
essentially hybrid and (c) beset by the law-finance paradox, which reveals the location of
(d) power, defined as the differential relation to law.

a. Financial Markets as Rule-bound Systems
Financial markets do not exist outside rules but are constituted by them. It is possible
to distinguish different rules and rule makers, such as private and public ones. This has
led some to argue that actors can opt out of the legal system and constitute their own
system (Bernstein 1992). This system, however, is also rule-bound. The more a financial
system moves from relational finance to entities and ultimately markets, the more it
depends on a formal legal system with the capacity to authoritatively vindicate the rights
and obligations of contractual parties or to lend its coercive powers to the enforcement of
such claims.20 The credibility and value of fungible financial contracts depends on such
backing. This is why an organization such as the ISDA was formed to develop templates
for financial instruments that would be enforceable in multiple jurisdictions and lobbied
states to ensure that critical pieces of legislation validated the contracts it sponsors.
The central role of law in financial contracting is reflected in the fact that every
financial intermediary wanting to issue a new financial instrument employs lawyers to
ensure that it is compliant with relevant laws and regulations. This is done even, or
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Some authors have identified China as a possible exception to this rule. See (Allen 2005). Yet, their
analysis of the quality of law in China is rather narrow and disregards other means by which the state or the
Communist Party in China effectively backs the financial system. See (Heilmann 2005).
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precisely, when their very purpose is to mitigate regulatory costs for the issuer. 21
Regulatory arbitrage is a sophisticated process by which financial innovation is made
rule-compliant, at least on its face (Awrey 2013). This is costly and often requires
extensive negotiations with regulators or redrafting in the wake of court challenges. Yet,
without this these instruments would have little value.
There is therefore no such thing as “unregulated” financial markets, and deregulation
is a misnomer (Hodgson 2013). It signifies not the absence of regulation, but the implicit
delegation of rule making to different, typically non-state actors, with the understanding
that in all other respects they enjoy the full protection of the law. The delegation of such
rule-making powers is not limited to small-scale markets. Indeed, the governance of the
largest of all financial markets, the global foreign exchange market, has been delegated to
a club-like informal coalition of market participants and public regulators (Harvey 2013).
That, however, does not make these markets rule-less or external to the law. There is
hardly a market where the presence of sovereigns is stronger than in FX markets. After
all, what are traded in these markets are currencies issued by sovereign states. They are
principals in these transactions, with private intermediaries effectively posing as their
agents (Mehrling 2013).
The peculiar structure of global FX markets as we know them today emerged after the
demise of the Bretton Woods system. It resulted as much from turf fighting among
different US regulators as from a sustained attempt to design a useful governance
structure for these markets. Incidentally, it framed domestic and global derivatives
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markets for the decades that followed. It all started with an amendment to the 1974
Commodity Futures and Trading Commission Act introduced by the US Treasury, the socalled Treasury Amendment (TA) (Harvey 2013).22 The TA deliberately cordoned off
futures and swaps, and because of its broad phrasing effectively all foreign exchange,
securities and mortgage derivatives, from the oversight of the Commodity Futures
Trading Commission (CFTC).23 The major justification was that the primary dealers in
these markets were best equipped to govern them. Moreover, the Treasury assured
Congress that it, through the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency, together with the
Fed would operate as foreign exchange markets’ shadow regulator. The Fed, of course, is
not only a shadow regulator, but also a market participant. It forged an alliance with key
market participants by establishing the Foreign Exchange Committee housed at the New
York Fed (itself owned by major banks), which facilitates the coordination of market
governance. Private membership in this organization is determined by market share
(Harvey 2013).
Sovereign debt markets pose the greatest challenge for the assertion that all financial
markets are rule-bound, because sovereigns can manipulate the legal basis on which they
issue debt and enjoy far-reaching immunity from litigation and prosecution. They can
decree the riskiness of sovereign debt in national law (thereby inducing financial
intermediaries to hold lots of it) and so far have been able to maintain that stance for
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The text of the Treasury Amendment reads as follows: “Nothing in this Act shall be deemed to govern or
in any way be applicable to transactions in foreign currency, security warrants, security rights, resales of
installment loan contracts, re-purchase options, government securities, mortgages and mortgage purchase
commitments, or in puts and calls for securities, unless such transactions involved the sale thereof for
future delivery conducted on a board of trade”. For details see Harvey (2013).
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global prudential regulation as well (see Gelpern and Gulati 2013).24 This reflects the fact
that each occupies by definition the apex of its domestic financial system. Still, sovereign
debt markets are also rule-bound. Sovereigns are reluctant to default on their debt and
when they do, they seek to give it the appearance of rule abidance. As Gelpern and Gulati
point out, when Greece restructured its debt it sought to legitimize this action by pointing
to negotiations with “major creditors”. It also subjected new bonds to the law of England,
thus relinquishing its power to unilaterally enforce another restructuring in the future. In
short, sovereign debt markets occupy an interesting place in the legal construction of
global markets. The central role of sovereigns in these markets imposes limits on the
legal enforceability of contractual commitments. That, however, does not place sovereign
debt outside the law or commonly accepted rules of conduct in global financial markets,
as those countries that have repeatedly thwarted these rules have found out when trying to
re-access the market after a default.

b. Financial Markets’ Essential Hybridity
The discussion of FX and sovereign debt markets highlights another feature of
finance that permeates it from top to bottom: its essential hybridity. Financial systems are
not state or market, private or public, but always and necessarily both (Mehrling, this
issue). This follows from the facts that financial instruments must be enforceable, that
finance is hierarchical and that in the last instance a sovereign has to stand in to protect
the financial system from self-destruction.
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Anyone can issue IOUs, whether public or private. But not all IOUs find takers at all
times; even those that do initially may not be sellable at a future date when liquidity
shortages privilege cash or cash substitutes. Cash, of course, is the legal tender that states,
not private parties, alone can issue. This official money is the default currency and the
benchmark for valuing other assets traded in the economy; and final settlement between
financial institutions and between them and the central bank is done in the official legal
tender. Money is also the currency used by the government to make its (domestic)
payments and collect on its claims, including its tax claims.
This is not to say that currencies not backed by state money cannot exist. However,
they tend to be instable and prone to collapse whenever commitments made in the past
require substantial readjustment in light of new events. Consider the fate of bank-issued
money in the US prior to the establishment of the US dollar as the common currency.
Many state banks issued their own IOUs with nothing but their own assets to back them.
Predictably, they failed whenever too many claimants sought to make good on their
claims at the same time (Dwyer 1996). This follows from the hierarchy of finance and the
fact that non-state entities by definition have limited resources. Critically, their ability to
mobilize fresh resources may falter precisely when it is most needed, namely in times of
crisis.
Even with a common currency but without a public backstop a financial system is on
instable footing. Mr. JP Morgan was able to coordinate a private sector rescue of the US
financial system in 1907, but only because relative to the capacity of the private entities
involved in the rescue its size was still manageable. The crisis raised sufficient concerns
about the reliability of private sector bailouts to provide the political impetus for a new

25

central bank, the Federal Reserve, established in 1913 (Carlson and Wheelock 2012).
That even such a system is not immune to crisis was revealed in the Great Depression
when thousands of banks failed as the Federal Reserve stood by, hamstrung by legal
rules25 on what assets it could possibly accept against cash, the only means of pay that
would find takers in the midst of the crisis.
Even absent such restrictions, not all central banks or all sovereigns have access to
unlimited supplies of high-powered money. Those without their own currency or with
debt denominated in foreign currencies do not. Without such resources, a country that
faces a banking crisis typically finds itself in a currency and sovereign debt crisis as well.
To be effective any outside help must come from more credible backstops, i.e. other
sovereigns or their agents, such as the International Monetary Fund, which itself is
funded by sovereign states (Woods 2006). The US government helped Mexico in 1994 in
the midst of the Tequila crisis to the tune of US$50 bln;26 the IMF played a critical role in
the East Asian financial crisis of the late 1990s (Feldstein 2002); and a consortium of the
IMF, the ECB and the European Commission (the Troika) is now at work in the
European sovereign debt crises.
In sum, describing finance as a system of private/private commitments subject to
some (external) constraints that may enhance market efficiency (Gilson and Kraakman
1984) misses much of what is unique to contemporary finance: It is based on money as
the legal tender, relies on the legal enforceability of private/private commitments and in
the last instance depends on backstopping by a sovereign. Indeed, the scale of today’s
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transnational financial markets would not be feasible without their legal backing, even as
the very size of financial markets thus created pushes the limits of what sovereigns are
willing or able to provide, individually or collectively. The essential hybridity of finance
thus also points to where ultimate power over finance rests: with the polities that are
backstopping the system. Central bankers may have replaced their voices by speedy
action for now: “Forget the G7 – Watch the C5”, as Mehrling put it in a blog.27 And yet,
their effectiveness ultimately hinges on the legitimacy of their actions in the eyes of the
public that entrusts them with their discretionary powers.

c. The Law-Finance Paradox
It follows that law and finance stand in an uneasy, paradoxical relation to one another.
Law lends credibility to financial instruments by casting the benevolent glow of coercive
enforceability over them. But the actual enforcement of all legal commitments made in
the past irrespective of changes in circumstances would inevitably bring down the
financial system. If, however, the full force of law is relaxed or suspended to take account
of such change, the credibility law lends to finance in the first place is undermined.
The propensity of a financial system to reach the point of crisis or self-destruction at
which only the suspension of ex ante commitments can save it is determined by how it is
constructed in the first place. Different financial instruments are associated with different
risks for investors and the overall system. Every IOU entails some future commitment to
pay, but not all require payment of a fixed amount at a future date irrespective of actual
earnings. Credit instruments do, but common stock does not: Paying dividends is tied to
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profits actually generated, and in the event of bankruptcy common stockholders are last
in line to recover. In its unadulterated form equity finance ensures that the fortunes of
stockholders and firms are tied to one another, which is why greater reliance on equity
finance especially by financial intermediaries has been called for (Admati and Hellwig
2013). In contrast, creditors can extract repayment irrespective of the firm’s actual
earnings to the point of insolvency. The power to “toll the bells to firms” (Pistor 2008) is
what gives creditors so much leverage. In practice, the distinction between equity and
debt finance has become increasingly blurred, not the least because of regulatory
leniency. Equity is often credit-financed and debtors seek refinancing if they cannot make
due on their obligations to creditors. Actual earnings thus become a second order concern
to access to liquidity. Yet, the more a system relies on refinancing, the more fragile it is
(Minsky 1986).
Individual market participants will seek to protect themselves against the vagaries of
fragile finance. They will seek to shift the burden of uncertainty to their counterparties. A
good example is the bargaining power banks use to shift the burden of dealing with future
uncertainties to their customers (Rona-Tas and Guseva 2013). Alternatively, market
participants will enter into hedging transactions or buy insurance. That, however, does
not purge uncertainty or liquidity scarcity from the system. When too many rely on
insurance and the event that triggers payout actually materializes (irrespective of the low
probability assigned to it), these legal mechanisms can further destabilize the system by
causing a run on viable assets or intermediaries. At this point the system can be saved
only by relaxing or suspending the full force of law: By making funding available where
no funding is owed and by bailing out intermediaries that should be liquidated in
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accordance with the law.

d. Power as the Differential Relation to Law
Unpacking the legal construction of finance thus leads us to the elasticity of law and
from there to the political economy of finance. Where law is elastic decisions are not
predetermined by legal rules but left to the discretion of “power wielders” (Grant and
Keohane 2005). Power can thus be defined as the differential relation to law. Where law
is elastic power becomes salient. The critical questions are who exercises it, to whose
benefit, how its exercise is legitimated and to whom the power wielders are held
accountable.
Power is exercised throughout the financial system. It is exercised by those who have
the resources to extend support to others without being legally obliged to do so. Those
who have access to unlimited resources have the most power: Sovereigns with control
over their own currency and debt. Their access to unlimited resources derives from their
power to issue the legal tender, to use their means of coercion to levy taxes on their
subjects and to coordinate political and economic resources to make credible their
commitments (Kapadia 2013). The absence of any of these three conditions can
undermine the credibility of a sovereign as effective lender of last resort. By the same
token it positions the sovereign towards the periphery of the global hierarchy of finance.
The Eurozone crisis vividly demonstrates that the absence of either taxing power or
political unity undermines the viability of the common currency (ibid). This in turn has
undermined the euro’s quest to compete with the US dollar for global reserve status.
Similarly, investors’ fear about the US ‘fiscal cliff’ – the automatic budget reductions that
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were feared to push the US economy into a recession at the end of 201228 – suggests that
the mere power of the sovereign to tax is not sufficient. The ability to mobilize the
political will to use this power and coordinate other policies that are conducive to
effective economic management is equally important.
Emerging markets are more likely to issue their debt under foreign law, and detailed
debt covenants specify their obligations in contracts designed by law firms in London or
New York and issued for the most part under the laws of these jurisdictions with
underwriter involvement. In contrast, most developed economies issue debt without such
formalities (Gelpern and Gulati 2013). If debt is issued under domestic law it is, in
principle, always renegotiable, as the sovereign can change the terms of the underlying
legislation. Debt issued under foreign law requires contractual provisions, such as
collective action clauses (CACs), lest every single creditor can veto its renegotiation.
CACs have been common in sovereign debt covenants issued under English law, but not
those issued under New York law. Indeed, there was widespread fear that the
introduction of such clauses might increase the costs of borrowing for emerging markets
(ibid). This signifies that for countries on the periphery an unrelenting adherence to
contractual commitments was deemed critical for their access to global capital markets.29
Similarly, when countries in the Eurozone agreed to introduce CACs into sovereign debt
contracts for their domestic debt, concerns were raised that these countries were thereby
putting themselves on equal footing with the likes of Zimbabwe (ibid). State agents thus
28
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distinguish between formalizing the elasticity of contractual commitments and retaining
an informal option to change the conditions of debt contracts. The latter is reserved for
those who are or would like to be at the system’s apex.
One’s location in the hierarchical financial system is not determined by one’s own
actions alone or the raw size of their economy. When events necessitate the readjustment
of investment strategies, investors flee to assets they regard as relatively more safe. These
actions render those left holding assets others have dumped on the periphery of the
system, where their fate will be decided by the full force of the law – unless they find a
backstop willing and able to step in and accept these assets against more credible ones or
cash. The availability of a viable backstop determines the credibility of different assets in
times of crisis and therefore the survival chances of those who hold them.
In principle, private and public dealers can perform such backstopping functions. Yet,
private dealers face a hard budget constraint. 30 They therefore tend to cease rescue
operations when these activities might undermine their own survival. Thus, Goldman
Sachs provided a lifeline to Bear Stearns by rolling over (for a fee) its derivatives
obligations until days before it collapsed.31 It withdrew support when it feared that its
own viability was put at risk. At that point there was only one place left to go: The US
Fed, with its unlimited access to high-powered money.
Neither private nor public dealers are legally obliged to provide liquidity to entities in
distress, and no one has a legal claim to be rescued. Goldman Sachs was not obliged to
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offer a lifeline to Bear Stearns and faced no liability when it withdrew it. Similarly,
central banks are not legally obliged to offer convertibility to most or all assets into legal
tender and are sometimes explicitly barred from doing so – for example, the ECB with
regard to lending directly to sovereign members or the Fed during the Great Depression.
They (or other regulators) may be legally required to make good on deposit insurance or
honor requests for cash at their discount window to eligible entities, but these obligations
are limited in scope – and purposefully so. In the event of a crisis, however, legal
constraints are more often honored in their breach than in their enforcement.

e. LTF as a Positive Theory
Taken together, the elements of LTF suggest that law is central to finance in at least
three respects: Law lends authority to the means of payment; it spurs regulatory pluralism
by delegating rulemaking to different stakeholders and in doing so helps draw boundaries
between different markets; and it vindicates financial instruments and other financial
contracts. State authorized and backed money serves as the backbone of modern financial
systems. It is the common reference price for all other assets; it is also the asset of last
resort when others no longer find takers. Further, law sets the stage for legal pluralism by
determining which actors, activities and instruments to regulate and which to leave to
private regulation. The greater the tolerance for competing regulatory regimes, the greater
the probability that competition will increasingly take the form of regulatory arbitrage,
i.e. the gaming of the very system that makes and shapes finance. Last but not least, law
recognizes contracts and defines the contours of their enforceability. This enhances their
credibility, but to the extent that financial instruments are designed to weaken regulatory
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costs it effectively sanctions regulatory arbitrage and the erosion of formal law.
Several testable predictions about the development of financial markets, the effects of
law on finance, and the political economy of finance can be derived from this analysis.
First, financial systems cannot reach equilibrium outcomes, but will always remain
instable. Law lends credibility and predictability to contracts, but under conditions of
uncertainty this can turn into a source of financial instability – in particular when it lends
full coercive enforcement powers to contracts based on assumptions that turn out to be
wide off the mark and leave no room for adaptation. Second, as a credibility enhancing
device law is critical for the expansion of finance from the apex into the periphery
domestically and globally and for replacing relational with arms-length market based
finance. Yet, the costs and benefits of financial expansion are not equally distributed.
Initially, actors at the apex and the periphery benefit from financial expansion; the former
in the form of greater market share or higher profitability, the latter from improved access
to affordable credit. However, in times of crisis the periphery is more likely to face the
full force of the law generating higher default risks and greater economic stress. Third,
the survival of the system is determined at its apex. Those entities (states or
intermediaries) in greater proximity to the apex are therefore more likely to benefit from
a relaxation of the rules or a suspension of the full force of the law. Fourth, actors will
seek to position themselves strategically towards the apex of the domestic or global
system where they are most likely to benefit from another lifeline. On their own they may
not have full control over their location in the system, but they can influence it by various
means ranging from social or political ties, influencing the rulemaking process, to making
themselves systemically important. Fifth, jointly these forces are likely to lead over time
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to a greater concentration of finance at the apex where the ultimate backstop resides. The
greater concentration of finance at the apex will require the mobilization of ever-larger
resources to stabilize it. Sixth, because these resources are tied to sovereigns they require
political backing of the ultimate backstop’s polity. In the last instance it is the polity of
whoever happens to be the global backstop that will determine the fate of the global
financial system.

5. LTF through the Lens of Competing Theories

LTF differs from other theories on finance in that it calls attention to finance’s legal
construction. Recognizing the importance of law to finance is not new, but asserting that
law is essential to the very existence of contemporary finance is. This also puts LTF apart
from theories in socioeconomics that have long asserted the relevance of social structures
to finance, but have been less explicit about the specific role attributed to law or the state
as compared to other structures (Hodgson 2009). Finally, while various economic
theories have recognized the inherent instability of finance, they tend to abstract from the
legal and institutional structures. LTF complements these theories by illuminating the
legal and institutional transmission mechanisms of instability.

a.

Law & Finance
The literature on Law & Finance is of relatively recent vintage. It emerged in

recognition of the difficulties of developing financial markets in the former socialist
world and emerging markets (Shleifer and Vishny 1997; La Porta et al. 1998). It was
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preceded by the literature on law and economics that sought to explain legal rules and the
development of law in terms of efficiency. Some authors postulated that litigation the
common law trends towards efficient (Priest 1977; Rubin 1977), while others pointed to
biases in the selection of cases for litigation (Bailey and Rubin 1994).
The major contribution of the Law & Finance literature was to introduce systematic
empirical analysis into the analysis of law and economics is and to show that law matters
to finance mostly by vindicating investor rights: Legal systems that better protect these
rights tend to have more developed financial systems.32 The choice of legal system in
turn has been linked to politics in the early development of the new nation states (Glaeser
and Shleifer 2002). Those with greater political stability could afford decentralized
systems of legal ordering, whereas those that faced chaos were beholden to centralized
control with weaker property rights afforded to individuals (Djankov et al. 2003). This
was the birth of the “New Comparative Economics”, published in this journal ten years
ago.
Thus, Law & Finance offers both a theory of how law relates to finance and an
account of the political economy of legal systems where political conditions in the early
development of law prove highly path dependent. 33 However, they too treat law and
finance as separate spheres that are related in a causal, unidirectional fashion, not as
structurally intertwined. Law determines the degree of investor protection and thereby
establishes the rules of the game for a financial marketplace in which actors respond to
32
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the incentives law creates. Absent legal protection investors would have to rely more on
tangible assets, such as large stakes in firms, to exercise control. It follows that within
this theoretical framework law plays a critical role in the making of liquid markets, in that
the protection afforded by law replaces more primitive forms of control. But this is where
the story ends. Better protection of individual rights is always associated with better
finance and negative feedback loops are ruled out. Any deviation is attributed to
exogenous factors, such as wars, natural catastrophes or financial crises (La Porta, Lopezde-Silanes, and Shleifer 2008). Law & Finance is thus a theory for good times in finance,
not one for bad times.
Further, Law & Finance assumes that knowledge is perfect and liquidity is a free
good. Only then does the equation of better protection equals better financial systems
hold. If instead knowledge is imperfect and market participants cannot fully predict the
future, they will need to readjust past investment strategies. Under these conditions strong
legal protection may prevent the adjustment of commitments made in the past to account
for change. Moreover, Law & Finance asserts that good law creates the right incentives
for good behavior, and bad law for bad behavior. Yet, what is good or bad law, good or
bad behavior may well differ when viewed from the perspective of individual actors or
the system. Financial innovation that gives an entity a competitive edge over others by
mitigating the effects of regulation may enhance its profitability. The same actions may
destabilize the system, especially when widely mimicked by others, as they will be in a
competitive system. In theory, actors should anticipate the potential harmful effects of
their action. However, they can do this only if they have unlimited foresight as to what
effects their individual actions may have on the system as a whole. Even then, they may
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bet on a rescue by a lender of last resort. Moral hazard is, of course, a staple in standard
economics. What is less appreciated is that the need for bailout may be caused by the
very legal protections that are meant to further financial development. That would require
a shift from the belief in the equilibrating forces of markets to recognizing their inherent
instability.
Reaching the conclusion that finance is instable does not necessarily require
conversion to Keynesianism. Mainstream economists have arrived at similar results only
by different routes. Allen and Gale have shown that “incomplete” financial markets tend
to spread contagion, a key source of market instability (Allen and Gale 2000). Moreover,
incomplete contract theory (Hart and Moore 1999) has established that no matter how
hard parties try, they cannot write complete contracts. Incomplete contract theory
recognizes not only transaction costs but also uncertainty as the root causes of the
imperfect state of the world: Parties are fundamentally unable to foresee future
contingencies. Indeed, Bolton and Rosenthal have shown that under conditions of
extreme uncertainty (they use the case of agriculture in nineteenth-century US), ex post
intervention by the state in private contracting can be socially optimal (Bolton and
Rosenthal 2002).34 They argue that debt contracts that are not state-contingent in their
payment obligations are incomplete. Viewed in this light, a government imposed debt
moratorium completes contracts when contingencies materialize the contracts did not
anticipate or provide for. The Law-Finance Paradox goes a step further. It proposes that
state contingencies may be as much a problem as a solution. They are frequently built
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into modern financial contracts in the form of collateral calls or margin calls. However,
when an unrealistically low probability is attached to the possible manifestation of such
an event can such clauses can become the cause for financial crisis. Still there is
agreement about the fact that under conditions of uncertainty contracts may require future
adjustment – and not only at the apex of the financial system.

b.

Theories on the Social Structure of Finance
The rise of law and finance has been paralleled by the rapidly expanding field of

financial sociology (Carruthers and Kim 2011). From this perspective finance is a social
system like many others, and financial relations are socially and culturally embedded.
Law is but one of multiple normative (or legal) orders that complement one another or
compete for dominance. Markets develop within these structures and are formed by them.
Detailed case studies developed in this tradition have shown how finance emerges from
and is shaped by social and political structures. A good example is the City of London,
where tensions between the Crown and its private financiers resulted in the creation of
the Bank of England, a privately owned entity that increasingly performed public, market
stabilizing functions (Carruthers 1996). The diamond exchange in New York (Bernstein
1992) is embedded in social practices of Jewish diamond traders, practices that were
sustained even as the trade expanded globally. For hundreds of years the global gold
market has been similarly embedded in a genteel culture of London-based financial
intermediaries that perceived themselves not only as market participants, but as its core
stakeholders (Harvey 2010).
Differences in social structures also help explain different strategies used for
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introducing consumer credit markets into different countries and legal systems. In
contexts where confidence in a reasonably high repayment rate was high, as in US
consumer lending markets, banks used a “big drop” approach for resolving the problem
of linking consumers, banks and retailers at once: They mailed millions of credit cards to
customers in urban centers in the 1950s (Guseva 2008). Where, in contrast, the absence
of a credit culture suggested that the propensity of repayment was too low to risk such a
strategy, as in post-socialist Russia and other transition economies, banks tied the
issuance of credit cards to managing the bank accounts of customers into which their
salaries were deposited (Rona-Tas and Guseva 2013).
Sociologists have also integrated technological change into the analysis of finance.
Electronic trading has eliminated traditional stock or commodities exchanges with their
open out-cry system, where traders could observe the stress their actions were causing on
others standing in the same pit next to them (MacKenzie 2006). This has effectively
eliminated the possibility to signal distress at a relatively early stage. Information
technology has increased the pace of financial transacting and introduced new systems of
ordering. Computer screens and the logic of algorithms used in the construction of
financial instruments have become new ordering devices (Lepinay 2011). The argument
that finance is embedded in social structures has been taken to new heights in a subfield
of socioeconomics that deals with “performativity” (Callon 1998). This concept stands
for the notion that by analyzing, observing and modeling the market, we shape it. These
analytical tools are “an engine, not a camera”, as MacKenzie has put it (MacKenzie
2006). In short, markets and the social structures in which they are embedded are
interdependent and shape one another.
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LTF has in common with these theories the idea that markets do not exist outside law
or other social structures. LTF does not assert that law is the exclusive force that shapes
markets. However, it maintains that law plays a more decisive role than most
socioeconomic analyses suggest. Financial relations are built on promises to deliver at a
future date (Carruthers and Kim 2011) – importantly, however, contemporary finance can
no longer rely on social relations to ensure compliance with promises made in the past.
Large-scale markets are feasible only if commitments made by someone far afield can be
enforced without any concern for the conditions under which those commitments were
made. The rise of complex financial markets is thus inextricably linked to the legal
construction of these markets.
The notion that private contracting takes place “in the shadow of the law” is, of
course, not new, and has been made in particular in reference to self-regulating markets
(Charny 1990). Yet, LTF goes a step further by arguing that absent state backing,
contemporary financial markets could not exist. Two factors account for that: The scale
and anonymity of contemporary financial markets, and their need for (occasional)
backstopping which can be effectively provided only by an entity with unlimited recourse
to high powered money. Such an entity can by definition only be a sovereign state.

c.

Financial Instability Theories
As discussed at the outset, LTF is premised on uncertainty and liquidity volatility. In

contrast to other theories that have emphasized these attributes of finance, LTF asserts
that the legal structure of financial markets can contribute not only to the success of
financial markets, but also to their undoing. In contrast, Frydman and Goldberg (2011)
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argue that financial instability results from the need to adjust investment strategies in
light of new events. Because investment strategies are sticky and are often adjusted only
once price swings have reached extreme territory, adjustment costs tend to be high. They
offer a detailed account of investor behavior, insisting that most of their actions can be
deemed rational in accordance with standard assumptions made in economic theory.35
Under conditions of imperfect knowledge, however, rational actions don’t result in
equilibrium outcomes, but instability.
Frydman and Goldberg do not link these insights to the legal and institutional
construction of contemporary financial markets. In part this can be explained by the
choice of financial markets that frame their analysis – equity markets – and in particular
on the allocative function they perform. If investors or traders did not have to concern
themselves with funding the capital they invest, liquidity concerns could indeed be safely
ignored. After all, equity finance is the most stable of financing strategies given its
reliance on future returns rather than future refinancing options. Yet, equity finance does
not operate independently of the manner in which equity positions are funded or the legal
commitments different funding strategies entail. Consider the difference between openor closed-end investment funds, where the former allow investors to withdraw their
investment at any time just as depositors can pull their money from a bank; the effect of
mark-to-market accounting rules on investors who themselves manage a volatile portfolio
of assets; or the ways in which repo markets link securities traders to dealers that offer
short term liquidity (Copeland et al. 2012). In short, allocation and funding are two sides
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On the ultimately unsatisfactory attempt by Behavioral Economics to blame irrationality for the failure of
neoclassical models to hold true in the real world, see Rona-Tas and Guseva this issue.
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of the same coin that is finance and should not be separated. The legal structure of
entities and its effects on their funding abilities as well as the nature of the contractual
commitments they enter into set the stage for financial market development in good times
and their undoing in bad times.
Adding law to their analysis would also refine the policy prescriptions Frydman and
Goldberg derive from their analysis. They see a role for regulators primarily when asset
prices reach extremes, which in light of historical evidence appear unsustainable.
Specifically, they call for a range of “excess-dampening measures”, such as guidancerange announcements and monetary response strategies (Frydman and Goldberg 2011,
240). A legally inspired analysis would suggest that excess is built into financial
contracting long before extreme asset prices are reached, namely at the time of designing
fungible financial contracts with rigid, non-negotiable commitments. Because they are
contractually hardwired, they will run their course irrespective of calls to moderation by a
central bank or other agent invoking excess dampening measures.
Minsky was more sensitive to the legal structure of finance. While he asserted that
financial markets are “inherently” instable, he also maintained that the relative stability
of financial systems is a matter of social choice and institutional design (Minsky 1986, 7).
If and when markets destabilize, as they will as competition drives them to take positions
that expose them to the vagaries of an uncertain future, proactive intervention is required
to set them once again on a more stable path. He therefore called for far reaching legal
restructuring of the economy (ibid at pp. 327).
LTF expands this framework in several directions. Minsky concluded his opus
magnum almost 30 years ago, at a time when the credit system was still largely entity-
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based rather than market-based, as it is today. Markets have also become more
interdependent globally, which requires a framework that is not tailored to a single
system, such as the US. Neither is it sufficient to focus on private credit relations alone.
Lastly, Minsky never developed a political economy of finance, and neither did most
other students of modern finance. LTF expands the institutional analysis from banks to
credit markets, and from domestic to global markets. The theory helps identity patterns of
vulnerability to financial distress that operate across legal systems and proides the
starting point for a more in-depth analysis of the kind Minsky offered for the US system.
Moreover, it develops a framework for tackling the political economy of finance by
relating it to the intersection of finance’s hierarchy and the elasticity of law.
Finally, LTF pushes the frontiers of Mehrling’s “Money View”. It builds on his
insight that finance is hierarchically organized. Yet, the “inherent” hierarchy of money is
deconstructed as being in important aspects institutionally determined (see also Mehrling
2013). While every credit-based financial system may have a pecking order of means of
pay, the particular configuration of the system, the number and complexity of financial
commitments and their interdependencies is determined by contractual commitments that
are sanctioned by law.
In sum, LTF builds on theories that take seriously the notion of fundamental
uncertainty and liquidity constraints. It expands on these theories by emphasizing that
financial interdependencies are legally hardwired and suggesting that this can amplify
liquidity constraints when past investments are adjusted in light of new facts. This allows
LTF to point to critical tensions in the makeup of modern-day finance: Its dependence on
law on one hand and law’s potentially destructive effect on finance on the other; the
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tendency of law to create regulatory pluralism with corrosive effects on the efficacy of
system-stabilizing laws and regulations; and the interdependency between “private”
credit and “public” money, i.e. the essential hybridity of finance.

6. Concluding Comments

LTF holds potentially important lessons for future reforms of domestic and global
markets. Since this paper has only introduced a theory that has not been subject to
extensive testing, 36 it would be premature to spell out in detail what these policy
implications might be. In lieu of that, this conclusion suggests how LTF’s reframing of
the relation between law and finance might affect reform strategies already adopted or
currently in the making.
Legislatures in countries around the world have told their constituencies that the
primary goal of these reforms is that “it” would not ever happen again – “it” being the
bailout of major financial intermediaries. Yet, as Minsky pointed out, financial instability
is inherent to modern finance and therefore the “it” he referred to in his paper “Can “It”
happen again” (Minsky 1982 (1963)), namely a major financial crisis, will re-occur. The
only question is when and how bad it will be – and that, of course, is impossible to
predict with any degree of certainty.
Legislatures have sought to make their commitments not to bailout credible by
tightening rules and strengthening regulatory oversight, including for systemically
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important banks. Yet, as the Law-Finance Paradox suggests, strengthening commitment
devices alone without reducing the system’s structural vulnerability to crises can prove
counterproductive. Legislatures have also sought to limit the powers of regulators and
central banks by subjecting bailout decisions to political control (Gadinis 2012).
Politicians have recognized that discretionary decision-making is an exercise of power
that may require political accountability. It remains to be seen where this leaves us in a
future crisis. When staring into the abyss of a financial collapse, politicians like
bureaucrats may opt for rescue rather than self-destruction. As the showdown over the
bailout package in the US in September 2008 has shown (when Congress voted down the
first version of the law37), however, this is by no means a foregone conclusion. Thus,
political control may increase the likelihood that Minsky’s “It” will happen again.
In contrast, recent reforms have not for the most part put the financial system on
more stable footing. Regulation of some entities has been strengthened. Banks in
particular have been taken to task and more derivatives have been forced onto formal
exchanges, reversing in part the 1974 Treasury Amendment as well as other measures the
rolled back state regulation, including the 1999 Graham-Leach-Bliley Act and the 2000
Commodity Futures Modernization Act. These reforms, however, do not address the
problem of the plurality of legal regimes – public and private – which under competitive
pressure will be exploited by regulatory arbitrage.
The most important space of regulatory arbitrage is the transnational financial
system. Most financial regulation remains at the national level, with regulatory
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standardization the most important mode of transnational coordination. However,
agreeing on standardized rules today that shall apply in an uncertain future does not
address the core problems of contemporary finance: uncertainty and liquidity volatility.
On the contrary, it hamstrings domestic regulators, as these rules are impossible to alter
short of another crisis. This makes the transnational regulatory regime unresponsive to
future change and as such unfit for dealing with an inherently instable financial system.
Many see a unified regulatory regime at the transnational level as a possible solution.
The most important example is the move towards a European Banking Union
contemplated for the Eurozone. Yet, a global financial regulator would face an
impossible task, and the European Banking Union remains an incomplete solution: It
includes only countries within the Eurozone plus other EU member states that opt into
this structure, but ignores interdependencies with other markets and financial centers,
most importantly with the City of London. Moreover, the banking union is premised on
the belief that financial crises can be prevented by firm ex ante commitments, as
suggested by its emphasis on the enforcement of a common rulebook. This has proven to
be wrong time and again. Indeed, from the perspective of LTF, unbending and
unbendable credible commitments may well increase rather than decrease the likelihood
and/or severity of a crisis. Addressing this Law-Finance Paradox earlier rather than later
by relaxing contractual commitments may prevent a full-scale crisis. This may to some
extent undermine the credibility of many innovative instruments – but that might be
socially desirable. It makes little sense to lend the coercive powers of the state to

46

instruments if in doing so it transforms them into “weapons of mass destruction”.38
What is instead needed is an approach to financial regulation that recognizes both the
interdependencies of financial instruments, intermediaries and markets and the ways in
which law can amplify these interdependencies. This may sound like an impossible task
and is certainly contrary to conventional understanding of the role of law in finance as an
efficiency enhancing infrastructure. Yet, there are plenty of examples in legal practice
that demonstrate how legal and contractual commitments can be adjusted to take account
of an uncertain future. Credit moratoria in response to droughts or other shocks in
agriculture are one example (Bolton and Rosenthal 2002). The handling by the German
Supreme Court (Reichsgericht) of credit contracts during the period of hyperinflation in
the 1920s is another. After ruling for years that “pacta sunt servanda”, causing an
“endogenous legal boom” that almost brought the legal system to its knees as more and
more creditors rushed to the court system to beat the loss in value their claims suffered as
the currency was in free fall (Wolf 1993), the court used the principle of good faith
embodied in the civil code to adapt contracts to new circumstances. The principles it and
subsequent courts developed have since been incorporated into a new provision of
Germany’s civil code:
If circumstances which became the basis of a contract have significantly changed
since the contract was entered into and if the parties would not have entered into the
contract or would have entered into it with different contents if they had foreseen this
change, adaptation of the contract may be demanded to the extent that, taking account of
all the circumstances of the specific case, in particular the contractual or statutory
distribution of risk, one of the parties cannot reasonably be expected to uphold the
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contract without alteration.39
One of the major lessons LTF holds is that we need more safety valves of this
kind – not only at the apex where law tends to be relatively more elastic, but also on the
periphery of the system. The alternative is to put our faith into central banks – their
willingness and ability to do the right thing ex post facto. Obviously this raises important
question about how best to design such safety valves; whether courts, regulators or other
agents are best placed to perform such a role; who should be empowered to initiate an
intervention and how to ensure that the relief safety valves would offer in times of
distress is not abused or weakens ex ante commitments. These are difficult questions that
require further research and analysis. LTF’s contribution is to put such questions up front
and center for research and reform agendas.

39
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